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ontology_2015.xml 78.99 KiB
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<argument xml:lang="de">
<p>Üblicherweise beruht das Design von Ontologien auf der Annahme, dass die
Bedeutung einer Proposition sich aus der Bedeutung ihrer Elemente
(Begriffe) und ihrer syntaktischen Struktur ergibt. Die Reichweite
dieses ›Prinzips der Kompositionalität‹ ist jedoch innerhalb der
Semantik strittig. Die Gegner des Prinzips verteidigen den Primat der
Satzbedeutung und leiten die Bedeutung von Begriffen aus ihrem Beitrag
zur Satzbedeutung ab. Angesichts dieses Sachstandes argumentiert der
Aufsatz zugunsten eines Zugangs zum Design von Ontologien, der keine
Stellungnahme in dieser Debatte voraussetzt. Die hier vorgeschlagene
›minimale doxographische Ontologie‹ dient als heuristisches Werkzeug zur
Erfassung unbekannter oder komplexer Gegenstandsbereiche. In ihr werden
Satzbedeutungen als unanalysierbar angesehen und auf einen Träger des
propositionalen Inhalts (Personen oder Texte) bezogen. Die Stärken eines
solchen Ansatzes werden zunächst anhand eines vereinfachten Beispiels
erörtert, einer Analyse von juristischen Begriffsdefinitionen
alkoholischer Getränke. Ein komplexerer Anwendungsfall betrifft die
doxographische Analyse von Debatten in der Geschichte der
frühneuzeitlichen Philosophie. Schließlich erörtert der Aufsatz kurz,
wie ein solcher Ansatz erweitert werden kann, indem Ontologien als
hermeneutische Werkzeuge zur Deutung von Quellen der
Philosophiegeschichte verwendet werden. </p>
</argument>
<argument xml:lang="en">
<p>Traditionally, ontology engineering is based on the presumption that the
meaning of a proposition results from the combination of the meaning of
its elements (concepts) and its syntactical structure. The reach of this
›principle of compositionality‹ is, however, a contested topic in
semantics. Its opponents defend the primacy of propositional meaning and
derive the meaning of concepts from their contribution to propositional
meaning. In this situation, this paper argues for an approach to
ontology design that does not presuppose a stance in this debate. The
proposed ›minimal doxographical ontology‹ is intended as a heuristic
tool charting unknown or complex domains. It regards propositional
meaning as atomic and relates it to a bearer of propositional content
(persons or texts). The strengths of such an approach are first
discussed in a simplified example, the analysis of legal stipulations on
alcoholic beverages. A more complex use case concerns the doxographical
analysis of debates in the history of early modern philosophy. In
closing, the paper sketches briefly how this approach may be extended
using ontologies as hermeneutic tools in the interpretation of sources
from the history of philosophy.</p>
</argument>
</div>
<div type="chapter">
<head>1. Introduction</head>
<p>In recent years, technologies of knowledge representation that are usually
subsumed under the heading of the ›semantic web‹ have been used within the
digital humanities in disciplines as diverse as literary studies (e. g.
regarding <ref
target="http://www.digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/3/4/000068/000068.html"
>the ontology of fictional characters</ref>), philosophy (<ref
target="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://wab.uib.no/wab_philospace.page&date=2014-09-26"
>the Wittgenstein ontology</ref>), or history (<ref
target="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://linkedevents.org/ontology/2010-10-07/&date=2014-09-26"
>LODE</ref>, an ontology for the description of historical events). Thinking about the ›semantic web‹ comes most naturally to digital humanists
approaching the discipline from what could be called a ›cultural heritage‹
angle, e. g. librarians, archivists, or curators. In these areas, the
production of meaningful metadata is part of everyday workflows; the
transition from cataloguing guidelines to machine-readable metadata
standards to semantic web languages like RDF comes quite naturally and is an
important step in fighting the ›siloisation‹ of digital collections by
embedding them in a web of ›linked open data‹.<note type="footnote"> Cf.
<ref type="bibliography" target="#kemmann_grasping_2014">Kemmann
2014</ref>, section <quote>Embracing Technology</quote>.</note></p>
<p>Whether ontologies are an important part of the tool set of the digital
humanist is still a disputed question.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#kohle_bildwissenschaft_2013">Kohle
2013</ref>, p. 26f. with further references.</note> Some of the more
radical defenders of ontologies are unperturbed by this criticism. They
contend that ontologies are capable of not just representing or modelling
knowledge, but that they capture features of mind-independent reality.<note
type="footnote"> Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#smith_ontology_2014">Smith 2004</ref>, passim.</note> This
may even be true for artefacts.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#jansen_artefakte_2013">Jansen
2013</ref>, passim.</note></p>
<p>Whether semantic web technologies are a good fit for a given use case is,
however, first of all a technological problem that probably should not be
solved on purely philosophical grounds. Nevertheless, philosophy may be able
to contribute to some foundational debates in the digital humanities, if its
function is not taken to consist in the provision of foundations, but of
›maieutic impulses‹ that help to explicate hidden presuppositions and
stimulate to rethink unacknowledged biases and blind spots.</p>
<p>In this spirit, this paper discusses one such unacknowledged presupposition
of ontology design. Both the knowledge to be modelled in an ontology and the
ontology itself are necessarily articulated in propositional form.
Correspondingly, the formal structure of ontology languages (like the Web
Ontology Language OWL) are consciously modelled on central premises of
formal semantics, first and foremost the ›principle of compositionality‹.
This ancestry, however, may not be as innocuous as it seems, because
philosophers of language discuss controversially whether the impact of the
principle of compositionality is limited by a second principle, the ›context
principle‹. Thus, those interested in the capabilities of ontologies for
modelling knowledge must first clarify the possible impact of these debates
on ontology design.</p>
<p>The most appropriate strategy in such uncharted territory is ›risk
avoidance‹. Accordingly, it may be possible to use the tools of the semantic
web in an unassuming and modest manner, as a heuristic tool for mapping
vague, complicated, or partially unknown domains. I will first discuss the
<hi rend="italic">raison d'être</hi> for such a modest approach using a
somewhat contrived example and show some problems we encounter in trying to
extend the well-known wine ontology. It has already been shown how the
modelling of certain domains can profit from analytical restraint, namely if
we desist from analysing propositional content into component terms and bind
this content to the existence of concrete spatiotemporal entities as their
›bearers‹. The fruitfulness of such a minimal ontology of discourses
depends, however, on use cases in ›real life‹. Hence, the proposed ›ontology
of what people said‹ is applied to a ›doxographical map‹ of a spatially and
temporally circumscribed discourse in the history of philosophy, the debate
about the proper definition of the term ›philosophy‹ in early modern Iberian
philosophy.</p>
<p>The history of philosophy is, of course, more than just doxography. It should
ideally be complemented by interpretations of what people said. In my
conclusion, I will sketch how we may use the resources of semantic web
technologies to describe the conceptual hierarchies that are implicated by
what philosophers (and, possibly, others) have to say. However, it is
important to keep in mind that in the light of the foundational discussions
of the first part of this paper, such ontologies will always be
interpretations, leaving room for controversy and dissent that is probably
inevitable if we try to capture the meaning of a text. This is true
regardless of the medium we use to express our findings.</p>
</div>
<div type="chapter">
<head>2. Ontologies, Compositionality, Contextuality</head> <p>In a first approximation, ontologies can be defined as <quote>explicit formal
specifications of the terms in the domain and relations among
them</quote>.<note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#noy_ontology_2001">Noy / McGuiness
2001</ref>, p. 1.</note> Such a specification determines <quote>a
common vocabulary for researchers who need to share information in a
domain. It includes machine-interpretable definitions of basic concepts
in the domain and relations among them</quote>.<note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#noy_ontology_2001">Noy / McGuiness
2001</ref>, p. 1.</note> Moreover, such a specification is supposed
to be indispensable for ›analyzing domain knowledge‹.<note type="footnote">
Cf. <ref type="bibliography" target="#noy_ontology_2001">Noy / McGuiness
2001</ref>, p. 2.</note> OWL knows two sorts of concepts: classes
that <quote>provide an abstraction mechanism for grouping resources with
similar characteristics</quote><note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#dean_ontology_2004">Dean / Schreiber
2004</ref>, section 3.</note> and that are defined in so-called
›class axioms‹, and properties which are defined in so-called ›properties
axioms‹.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#dean_ontology_2004">Dean / Schreiber 2004</ref>, section
3.2.3.</note> The third category of statements to be found in an OWL
document concerns facts about individuals.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#dean_ontology_2004">Dean / Schreiber
2004</ref>, section 4.</note> All statements are composed out of
classes, properties, and constants as building blocks. These building blocks
must have been defined beforehand: their intension must be known, before
statements can be constructed.</p>
<p>This means that ontology engineering is firmly rooted in a theory of meaning
based on Frege's ›principle of compositionality‹: the <quote>[…] meaning of
a complex expression is determined by its structure and the meanings of
its constituents</quote>.<note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#szabo_compositionality_2013">Szabó
2013</ref>, section 1.</note> This nexus raises interesting
questions. Those who believe that ontologies may be capable of modelling
knowledge in a given domain without being committed to the stronger view
that they capture features of mind-independent reality may be content to
limit the scope of compositionality to a given language.<note
type="footnote"> In this case, the definition of compositionality is
formulated relative to a given language. Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#szabo_compositionality_2013">Szabó 2013</ref>, section 1.1:
<quote>For every complex expression e in L, the meaning of e in L is
determined by the structure of e in L and the meanings of the
constituents of e in L.</quote></note> Or they could maintain that
it only applies to the formal language which is used for articulating the
model of a domain, because artificial languages can be construed in such a
way as to exhibit compositionality as a feature. Those who subscribe to a
more realist interpretation of concepts in an ontology might probably have
to accept the stronger thesis of ›cross-linguistic compositionality‹:
<quote>For every complex expression e in L, the meaning of e in L is
functionally determined through a single function for all possible human
languages by the structure of e in L and the meanings of the
constituents of e in L</quote>.<note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#szabo_compositionality_2013">Szabó
2013</ref>, section 1.4.</note></p>
<p>But even if people may have reasoned disagreements about the scope of
compositionality, the ›compositionalist‹ bias is apparently built into the
very notion of an ontology as a ›common vocabulary for researchers‹.
However, this first Fregean principle conflicts with a second also discussed
in relation to his philosophy of language, the ›principle of contextuality‹
(or ›context principle‹): <quote>The meaning of an expression is determined
by the meanings of all complex expressions in which it occurs as a
constituent.</quote><note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#szabo_compositionality_2013">Szabó
2013</ref>, section 1.6.4.</note> So whereas compositionalists hold
that the meaning of a proposition is the sum total of its parts with the
semantic contribution of the structure of the proposition, contextualists
presume that propositional meaning comes first and that the meaning of the
constituents of a proposition depends on their role in all other
propositions in which they are contained.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#szabo_compositionality_2013">Szabó 2013</ref>, section 1.6.4: <quote>Compositionality is about
bottom-up meaning-determination, while the context principle about
top-down meaning-determination.</quote></note> But, again, the scope
of this priority claim must be determined precisely. In the context of this
paper, it is helpful to follow Stainton and to distinguish three different
understandings of the priority expressed in context principles, namely
methodological, metasemantical, and ›psychological‹ interpretations of this
priority of propositional over conceptual meaning.<note type="footnote"> Cf.
<ref type="bibliography" target="#stainton_context_2006">Stainton
2006</ref>, p. 109f. Helpful discussions of the role of both
principles in Frege can be found in <ref type="bibliography"
target="#janssen_frege_2001">Janssen 2001</ref>, passim. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#lemanski_urspruenge_2013">Lemanski
2013</ref>, passim, shows convincingly that the context principle is
an essential element of (neo-)Aristotelian logic.</note></p>
<p>In a <hi rend="italic">methodological</hi> perspective, we assume that an
analysis of the meaning of subsentential expressions must take into account
the context of the proposition they appear in. This understanding of
propositional priority may even be compatible with compositionality, because
we can understand how the meaning of a subsentential expression appearing in
a proposition that we understand can be isolated and transferred into new
contexts, allowing us to express a proposition that we had not yet
understood. In other words, we may need both compositionality and
contextuality of meaning in order to explain linguistic creativity, the
capability of expressing new thoughts by recombining elements which we
already understand.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#stainton_context_2006">Stainton 2006</ref>, p.
111.</note></p>
<p>But this does not mean that we are necessarily committed to the stronger <hi
rend="italic">metasemantic</hi> thesis that propositional meaning is in
some substantial sense the only (or only the most relevant) source for the
meaning of subsentential expressions. If this stronger thesis were
applicable to the methodology of ontology design, the project as such might
well be hopeless, because the recombination of terms could always lead to
mutations in meaning that are unforeseeable for the designer.</p>
<p>The <hi rend="italic">psychological </hi>thesis states that competent
speakers of a natural language cannot grasp the meaning of subsentential
expressions in isolation. Proponents of this view are probably sceptical
with regard to the attempt to represent online resources by applying
subsentential expressions to them: for them, tagging as such cannot be a
meaningful linguistic activity. Even though such radical criticism may be
misplaced, we should keep in mind that the vision of the semantic web is
built around the notion of knowledge. And – difficult philosophical problems
with non-propositional forms of knowledge like knowing-how or foundational
perceptual beliefs notwithstanding – an ontology can only codify knowledge
that can be explicated in propositional form. So even if we do not subscribe
to the strong psychological thesis that subsentential expressions as such
are basically meaningless, we could still accept the methodological
guideline that ontology design is concerned with knowledge that <hi
rend="italic">can </hi>be expressed or explicated in propositional form.
Implicit awareness of the meaning of subsentential expressions thus should
always be explicated in propositional form, regardless of whether competent
speakers can use or understand such expressions in isolation.<note
type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#shirky_ontology_">Shirky</ref> has not
helped the debate along by presenting ontologies and tagging as
alternative, but equivalent modes of representing online resources. On
the most fundamental level, both technologies solve different problems.
Tags are not statements; therefore, they do not encode knowledge. It may
be granted that tags are an efficient means for crowd sourced
classification and categorisation. But these are not the only – and
probably not the most important – use cases for ontologies. Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#shirky_ontology_">Shirky</ref>,
passim.</note></p>
<p>So even those ontology designers who would subscribe to compositionality as
an essential constituent of their self-understanding still face interesting
problems: should we presume that ontologies mirror cross-linguistic
universals or is their usefulness limited to speakers within a given
linguistic community? Do ontologies mostly track extensions, i. e. the
reference of terms, or should we give them an intensional interpretation as well, taking into account their meaning? Do we accept the notion that
statements in an ontology are fully devoid of context, so that their meaning
really consists of nothing but the sum total of subsentential meanings and
the contribution made by syntax?</p>
<p>In thinking about these questions we should never lose track of the fact that
ontologies are no end in themselves: they are technological instruments, so
that their scope and utility is determined first and foremost by pragmatic
considerations. It is therefore imprudent to assume that in order to build
an ontology it is necessary to choose one side in these complex and
unresolved philosophical debates. We should rather ask ourselves to what
extent our understanding of ontology design is determined by unacknowledged
biases in our implicit theories of meaning and whether it is possible to
build ontologies in a way that is not committed to any explicit stance.</p>
<p>Such a minimal understanding, at least on the heuristic level, of coming to
terms with a given domain would consist in two decisive moves:</p>
<list type="ordered">
<item>The meaning of propositions (i. e. their ›propositional content‹) is
taken to be opaque, it is only referred to by a name. This allows us to
avoid any commitment whether or not in a particular case the meaning of
a proposition can in fact be analysed compositionally.</item>
<item>Propositional contents are only allowed, if they can be connected to a
spatio-temporal entity (mostly a person or a document) that articulates
a propositional attitude towards this content, i. e. asserts, denies, or
reflects upon the content in question. In other words, the propositional
content designated by the name ›wine is made of grapes‹ is not to be
analysed into a subject term designating a drink, an object term
designating fruit, and a relation term designating the process of
turning fruit into a drink. And it is not to be admitted, unless we can
trace this content to a person or document that either asserts, denies,
or reflects on the propositional content ›wine is made from
grapes‹.<note type="footnote"> So what we model are intentional
objects and attitudes towards these objects rather than the objects
themselves.</note></item>
</list>
<p>It should be noted that the opacity of propositional meanings is not taken to
be absolute. We still can and should talk about subject terms, object terms,
and relation terms contributing to the constitution of propositional
content. But we can do so without preconceived notions about <hi
rend="italic">how</hi> single terms contribute to the meaning of the
propositions they appear in. In order to elucidate this point, I will
compare the approach proposed here to standard procedures of modelling
knowledge about statements, i. e. reification. But first it will be helpful
to discuss a simplified example that is meant to demonstrate that using the
approach proposed here we can deal in a simple and transparent manner with
inconsistent statements within a domain as well as with statements that may
prove to be troublesome when related to other domains.<note type="footnote">
This second requirement is particularly relevant, because a central
promise of ontologies is interoperability, which is why it employs
generic technologies like <quote>URIs (a generic means to identify
entities or concepts in the world), HTTP (a simple yet universal
mechanism for retrieving resources, or descriptions of resources),
and RDF (a generic graph-based data model with which to structure
and link data that describes things in the world)</quote>. Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#heath_linked_">Heath</ref>, section
<quote>What is Linked Data?</quote>.</note></p>
</div>
<div type="chapter">
<head>3. Legal Wine</head>
<p>§175-2-2 of the Legislative Rule 175CSR 2 governing the activities of the
West Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commission stipulates that wine in
the sense of West Virginia state law is </p>
<p><quote>any beverage obtained by the fermentation of the natural content of
fruits, or other agricultural products, containing sugar and includes,
but is not limited to, still wines, champagne and other sparkling wines,
carbonated wines, imitation wines, vermouth, cider, perry, sake, or
other similar beverages offered for sale or sold as wines containing not
less than seven percent (7%) nor more than twenty-four percent (24%)
alcohol by volume.</quote><note type="footnote"> West Virginia Alcohol
Beverage Control Administration, Definition 2.21.</note>
</p> <p>Beer is defined as <quote>any beverage obtained by the fermentation of
barley, malt, hops, or any other similar product or substitute, and
containing more alcohol than that of nonintoxicating beer or
nonintoxicating craft beer</quote>.<note type="footnote"> West Virginia
Alcohol Beverage Control Administration, Definition 2.3.</note>
Alcoholic liquors are defined as <quote>alcohol, beer, including barley
beer, wine, <hi rend="italic">including barley wine </hi>[my emphasis]
and distilled spirits, […]</quote>.<note type="footnote"> West Virginia
Alcohol Beverage Control Administration, Definition 2.1.</note> So in
West Virginia state law, the concept ›wine‹ includes products based on
pears, apples, and rice as long as they contain more than 7% and less than
24% ethanol, i. e. apparently all alcoholic beverages between these limits
that are not beer, since beer is discussed under a different heading. But
then again <quote>barley wine</quote> is identified as a kind of wine.
However, it shares all relevant properties with beer except its alcoholic
strength.</p>
<p>So the law is self-contradictory. If we wanted to model the taxonomy of
beverages in West Virginia state law, we would have to settle either for a
concept of wine that does include beverages made from barley and does not
require that its fermentation is based on sugar. Or we could disregard the
subsumption of barley ›wine‹ under the concept of wine, so that our model
remains incomplete.</p>
<p>Concepts in law are necessarily vague: courts must have the freedom to apply
the law to new beverages that were unknown when the legislation was written.
Stipulated meanings in a law can contradict our common-sense notions, so
that they cannot easily be mapped on existing ontologies that, like the wine
ontology, understand wine as potable liquid that is made from grape. The
occurrence of contradictions, vagueness, and tensions between concepts in
different domains can lead sceptics to the conclusion that, since concepts
are nothing but social constructions that do not follow the strict
requirements of the ontology engineer, the whole endeavour of modelling
knowledge in a machine-readable way is doomed. Conversely, realists would
probably point out that the legal meaning of ›wine‹ in West Virginia could
be reconstructed in principle, if we had functioning ontologies of artefacts
and social institutions. The resulting determination may be incredibly
complex, but feasible in principle.</p>
<p>Or we may wonder whether ›reification‹ can be a solution. RDF, an XML dialect
for describing web resources semantically, offers support for this
technique, so I will use its syntax to explain the notion.<note
type="footnote"> I discuss reification in RDF for the sake of
simplicity. Similar techniques are available for OWL. Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#stevens_reification_2010"
>Stevens / Lord 2010</ref>, passim.</note></p>
<p>RDF represents a reified statement as four statements with particular RDF
properties and objects: the statement (S, P, O), reified by resource R, is
represented by:</p>
<list type="unordered">
<item><code>R rdf:type rdf:Statement</code></item>
<item><code>R rdf:subject S</code></item>
<item><code>R rdf:predicate </code></item>
<item><code>R rdf:object O</code><note type="footnote">
<ref type="bibliography" target="#apache_2011-2014">The Apache
Foundation 2011–2014</ref>, section
<quote>Introduction</quote>.</note></item>
</list>
<p>The first triple (R rdf:type rdf:Statement) can be used to refer to the
statement that is composed of the tree terms S, P, and O. We could thus
refer to the concept <quote>Sake is legal wine in West Virginia</quote> by
simply naming the statement <quote>Sake_is_legal_wine_in_WV</quote> (or
SLWWV) and composing it out of the subject term <quote>Sake</quote>, the
relation <quote>is subclass of</quote>, and the object term
<quote>legal_wine_in_West_Virginia</quote>. Such a ›quadlet‹<note
type="footnote"> Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#stevens_reification_2010">Stevens / Lord 2010</ref>,
passim.</note> does allow us to refer to a statement as a whole. So we
could express the intentions of West Virginia legislators in formulating the
Legislative Rule by forming a second statement with <quote>West Virginia
legislators</quote> as subject term, <quote>stipulate</quote> as
relation term, and <quote>RLWWV</quote> as object term: West Virginia
legislators stipulate that Sake is legally wine in West Virginia.</p> <p>But reification helps us only as long as the domain to be modelled is not
characterised by self-contradictory notions. If we wanted to reify the
statement <quote>barley wine is wine</quote>, we would run into problems.
Since barley wine is in fact stipulated to be beer and since the stipulation
for beer contradicts the stipulations for wine (beer is based on
fermentation of grain, wine is based on fermentation of sugar), any ontology
trying to capture the intentions of West Virginia legislators is bound to
fail, because these intentions contradict each other: a coherent model is
impossible. This is different from a situation in which we are merely unsure
about the factual truth or falsity of a statement: a reified statement can
be false as long as its falsehood is purely factual.<note type="footnote">
It is then covered by the ›open world assumption‹ (OWA), at least as
long as its truth or falsity is unknown. Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#drummond_open_2006">Drummond / Shearer 2006</ref>, slide 9:
<quote>The OWA assumes incomplete information by
default.</quote></note> But reification cannot salvage us from logical
or conceptual incoherence.</p>
<p>The way out of this quandary is to deny <quote>barley wine is wine</quote>
the status of a RDF statement. <quote>Barley wine is wine</quote> is just
the name of a statement containing a subject term, a relation term, and an
object term, but none of these terms is part of a RDF triple.<note
type="footnote"> The ›abstract syntax‹ for RDF (<ref type="bibliography"
target="#cyganiak_rdf_2014">Cyganiak et al. 2014</ref>, section 3.1)
prescribes that the subject term and the relation term of a RDF triple
contain IRIs and not just strings (›literals‹). For the notion of an IRI
cf. <ref type="bibliography" target="#duerst_rfc_2006">Duerst / Suignard
2006</ref>, section 1.1.</note> Hence their aggregation in a
statement does not constitute a RDF statement. This expresses the fact that
the status of this triple of terms as the description of a resource (i. e.
something ›out there‹) is uncertain. Since the reference of the statement is
unclear, the same must be presumed for its meaning (or lack thereof). The
meaning of the statement is opaque, even though we can specify the terms it
contains. But it is equally important to describe the content, whatever it
may be, as a propositional content that can be ascribed to the creators of
this statement, i. e. presumably legislators in the state of West
Virginia.</p>
<p>The main advantage of such an approach over proper reification is that it can
be used heuristically: we do not need a full blown ontology for capturing
the content of a given discourse in a form that is amenable to further
refinement and development. This heuristic approach is particularly useful
when we are interested in the connection between what has been said and who
said it, i. e. in all domains in which we capture opinions of people, i. e.
in all domains that proceed ›doxographically‹. And it can accommodate the
development of the intension of a concept over time and thus be helpful to
track the history of concepts, beliefs, and theories.</p>
</div>
<div type="chapter">
<head>4. A Use Case: Capturing a Philosophical Discourse Doxographically</head>
<p>If we want to condense the approach sketched in this paper into a handy
slogan, we could say that it focuses on what people say about the world
rather than on what there is in the world. It records opinions rather than
facts. In the history of philosophy, doxography, the recording of opinions,
is a venerable tradition going back to ancient times.<note type="footnote">
However, it should be noted that assessments of its relevance differ.
<ref type="bibliography" target="#dillon_review_2006">Dillon
2006</ref> calls it <quote>a pretty low form of literature</quote>,
<ref type="bibliography" target="#mansfeld_doxography_2013">Mansfeld
2013</ref> is less skeptical and compares ancient doxographical
writings to present-day secondary literature.</note> So the minimal
ontology for capturing opinions of others can be said to proceed
›doxographically‹. It comprises abstract and spatiotemporal entities, namely
persons holding or texts articulating a certain belief and the propositional
content of the belief. Propositional attitudes can be understood as
properties of spatiotemporal entities, namely the property of asserting,
denying, or merely reflecting upon a given propositional content.</p>
<p> So the minimal ontology for capturing opinions of others can be said to
proceed ›doxographically‹. It comprises abstract and spatiotemporal
entities, namely persons holding or texts articulating a certain belief and
the propositional content of the belief. Propositional attitudes can be
understood as properties of spatiotemporal entities, namely the property of asserting, denying, or merely reflecting upon a given propositional
content.</p>
<p>Such a minimal doxographical ontology can be used to capture the content of a
given discourse without making any assumptions about the conceptual
structure of the respective domain. In a proof of concept at <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/wiki/EMTO_Nanopub">EMTO
Nanopub</ref> I have assembled ›doxographical facts‹ about the debate on
how to define ›philosophy‹ in early modern Iberian philosophy, collating the
viewpoints of <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?search=GasparCardilloDeVillalpando&title=Special:Search&go=Go"
>Gaspar Cardillo de Villalpando</ref>, the <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=Complutenses&fulltext=Search"
>Complutenses</ref>, the <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=Conimbricenses&fulltext=Search"
>Conimbricenses</ref>, <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=DiegoMas&fulltext=Search"
>Diego Mas</ref>, <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=VicenteMontanes&fulltext=Search"
>Vicente Montanes</ref>, <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=AntonioRubio&fulltext=Search"
>Antonio Rubio</ref>, <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/wiki/Jose_SaenzDeAguirre">José
Saenz de Aguirre</ref>, and <ref
target="http://emto-nanopub.referata.com/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&profile=default&search=franciscustoletus&fulltext=Search"
>Franciscus Toletus</ref> as ›nanopublications‹.<note type="footnote">
On the concept of nanopublications and their uses in the humanities cf.
<ref type="bibliography" target="#heßbrueggen-walter_tatsachen_2013"
>Heßbrüggen-Walter 2013</ref>, passim.</note> Even without
additional conceptual analysis of these propositions, we can gain some
interesting insights from this purely doxographical ›record keeping‹.</p>
<p><figure>
<media type="svg" xml:id="ontology_2015_001"
url=".../medien/svg/ontology_2015_001.svg">
<desc><ref target="#abb1">fig. 1</ref>: Propositional contents in
eight Iberian philosophers debating the proper definition of
philosophy. For an interactive version, please open the <ref
type="extern"
target="http://www.zfdg.de/sites/default/files/medien/svg/ontology_2015_001.svg"
>SVG-File</ref>. Javascript must be activated.</desc>
</media>
</figure></p>
<p><ref type="graphic" target="#ontology_2015_001">Figure 1</ref> shows a
network of the eight authors and the propositional content they assert, deny
or reflect upon in their texts about the proper definition of philosophy. It
has been produced in <hi rend="italic">gephi</hi>, a very comprehensive tool
for the production of network diagrams.<note type="footnote"> A presentation
of the guiding principles at work in <hi rend="italic">gephi </hi>can be
found in <ref type="bibliography" target="#bastian_gephi_2009"
>Bastian et al. 2009</ref>, passim.</note> The authors are displayed
as ›nodes‹ in this network diagram that only serve as starting points of
›edges‹ (arrows). The edges themselves are coloured according to the
propositional attitude that exists between author and propositional content:
green arrows signify an assertion, red arrows a negation, grey arrows a
neutral stance (e. g. a quotation). Propositional contents are siginified by
those nodes in which edges end. Since the visualisation is quite complex,
zooming and panning is supported via the <ref
target="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.cyberz.org/blog/2009/12/08/svgpan-a-javascript-svg-panzoomdrag-library/&date=20"
>SVGpan</ref> library. This allows the viewer to explore the structure
of the presented network of authors and propositional contents
interactively. The points of arrows are linked to URLs of nanopublications
on EMTO-Nanopub.</p>
<p>Even a cursory inspection of this visualisation provides some interesting
insights into parameters that usually are not in the centrer of attention of
historians of philosophy. We can discern marked differences in the ratio of
grey arrows to coloured arrows in various authors. Antonio Rubio mostly
provides theses without taking an explicit stance: most of the arrows
starting from this node are grey. In contrast, Cardillo de Villalpando (at
the bottom of the figure) prefers a thetical style of writing and expresses
only things that are the case: all arrows starting from this node are green.
A second surprising result is that, even though many may view Spanish scholasticism as a unified school of thought, many topics come up only in
one author. Only a minority of assertions or denials concern more than one
or two authors. Reflections like these may lead to a more precise
quantitative analysis of argumentative strategies, but would certainly not
have come into view by just reading the texts.</p>
<p>But beyond such ›stylometric‹ reflections, visualisations also help us to
understand the structure of a debate more precisely. Debates consist in
contents that are either asserted or denied. So we can omit all edges that
denote mere reflection on a given content and include only assertion and
negation as propositional attitudes (edges). And participants in a debate
are supposed to endorse at least one thesis that is endorsed or denied by
other participants as well.</p>
<p><figure>
<media type="svg" xml:id="ontology_2015_002"
url=".../medien/svg/ontology_2015_002.svg">
<desc><ref target="#abb2">fig. 2</ref>: Propositional contents that
are asserted or denied in the debate on how to define
philosophy. For an interactive version, please open the <ref
type="extern"
target="http://www.zfdg.de/sites/default/files/medien/svg/ontology_2015_002.svg"
>SVG-File</ref>. Javascript must be activated.</desc>
</media>
</figure></p>
<p>To apply these two criteria simplifies the picture considerably. One author
drops out of the picture, because he does not fulfil the second criterion:
Rubio does not take a stance that is either asserted or denied by another
author in the debate. Apparently, there are two camps in the debate, one
that seems to focus on philosophy as knowledge of causes (in the upper
region of <ref type="graphic" target="#ontology_2015_002">figure 2</ref>)
and one that seems to be concerned with the nexus between philosophy and the
Divine (in the bottom region of the <ref type="graphic"
target="#ontology_2015_002">figure 2</ref>). The bridge between both
camps is built by Vicente Montañés who asserts contents that can be found in
both camps. This impression is reinforced when we simplify further and
include only those propositional contents that are asserted by at least two
thinkers (<ref type="graphic" target="#ontology_2015_003">figure
3</ref>):</p>
<p><figure>
<media type="svg" xml:id="ontology_2015_003"
url=".../medien/svg/ontology_2015_003.svg">
<desc><ref target="#abb3">fig. 3</ref>: Propositional contents that
are asserted by at least two authors in the debate on how to
define philosophy. For an interactive version, please open the
<ref type="extern"
target="http://www.zfdg.de/sites/default/files/medien/svg/ontology_2015_003.svg"
>SVG-File</ref>. Javascript must be activated.</desc>
</media>
</figure></p>
<p>Two general points are worth emphasising: first, it should be noted that the
visualisations presented here are the result of algorithms for the
visualisation of networks implemented in <hi rend="italic">gephi</hi>. Some
minor redactions had to be added manually, but the overall representation of
the structure of the debate is not the result of conscious design decisions.
Since it is the machine that does the work of structuring the debate,
hermeneutic biases are minimised in this step. Second, this approach to
visualising excerpts of ›the history of philosophy‹ allows to trace each and
every ›visual assertion‹ to the relevant evidence, since every edge that
connects an author to a propositional content, i. e. every doxographical
statement, is linked to a nanopublication providing the bibliographical data
of the source text and the author making the doxographical statement.</p>
<p>›Doxography‹ is an essential, though mostly underrated, element in the
workflow of any historian of philosophy. Working with a text, we must first
produce summaries, excerpts, or other research notes that help us to fixate
its content, before we tackle the more complex task of reconstructing its
arguments, comparing them to other sources, and evaluating their validity
either in their historical context or in relation to contemporary problems.
To deal with this process using digital tools may in itself transform and
enhance existing practices in the history of philosophy. But, more
importantly, it also opens up new research questions and may change our
understanding of the discipline as a whole.</p> </div>
<div type="chapter">
<head>5. Digital Doxography and Heuristic Ontologies: A Vision</head>
<p>In the use case presented here, the ›semantic‹ dimension of semantic web
technologies was conspicuously absent. But we can now articulate a broader
vision of how the heuristic use of ontologies could transform not merely the
record keeping of the digital doxographer, but transform our strategies of
interpreting philosophical sources.</p>
<p>One particularity of (at least some) philosophical theories consists in the
way that they try to develop conceptual hierarchies that quite easily could
be transformed into statements of an ontology. If we take for example the
following two propositional contents:</p>
<p><code>S:philosophy R:is O:habit</code></p>
<p><code>S:part of philosophy R:is O:species of philosophy</code></p>
<p>For an expert in the domain it is fairly obvious that the first triple
expresses a relation of conceptual subordination: It could thus be
transformed into a corresponding OWL statement:</p>
<p><code><owl:Class rdf:ID="philosophy"></code></p>
<p><code><rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="habit" /></code></p>
<p><code></owl:Class></code></p>
<p>The second example expresses the identification of the extensions of two
concepts. Everything that is an example of the intension ›is part of
philosophy‹ is at the same time an example of the intension ›is a species of
philosophy‹. In other words, both concepts are, in the terminology of OWL,
equivalent classes:</p>
<p><code><owl:Class rdf:ID="part of philosophy"></code></p>
<p><code> <rdfs:equivalentClassOf rdf:resource="species of philosophy"
/></code></p>
<p><code></owl:Class></code></p>
<p>Of course, it is important to note that again we should not misconstrue such
statements as being concerned with philosophy as a thing in the world.<note
type="footnote"> This is a major difference to the goals of the Indiana
Philosophy Ontology Project that tries to capture a valid present day
understanding of philosophy as a scholarly discipline. Cf. <ref
type="bibliography" target="#buckner_encyclopedia_2011">Buckner et
al. 2011</ref>, passim.</note> These statements, too, must be
suitably qualified, namely as ›intentional objects‹ of philosophical thought
in a given period. And a second important caveat applies: by transforming
the isolated statements of a doxographical record into the reconstruction of
a conceptual scheme, we leave the domain of ›facts‹ and enter into the realm
of interpretation. The more complex a source text is, the more we may expect
deviations between different attempts of reconstruction. In this respect,
the use of code as a medium of interpretation does not change its
fundamental hermeneutic characteristics. But ontologies, understood as the
expression of a coherent vision of a given conceptual scheme, could
nevertheless develop into powerful tools for the historian of
philosophy.</p>
<p>This is particularly true for those domains in which mass digitisation
projects have made available large number of previously unknown or
inaccessible sources. Since we may expect some progress regarding optical
character recognition of historical prints, it is to be hoped that a large
number of these texts will at some time in the future be available as
machine-readable e-texts. And even though practitioners in the field assert
that natural language processing of Latin texts is difficult, because these
texts are written in Latin, some progress on this front will hopefully be
made too.<note type="footnote"> Cf. <ref type="bibliography"
target="#passarotti_leaving_2010">Passarotti 2010</ref>,
passim.</note> The upshot of this is that these developments may help us
in extracting doxographical triples from a large number of texts, both in
Latin and the vernaculars, in order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive
understanding of the historical record as it stands. The methodology
proposed here may then prove to be a fruitful strategy for turning this
content into semantically rich information.</p>
</div>
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target="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/compositionality/"
>online</ref>]</bibl>
</listBibl>
</div>
<div type="abbildungsnachweis">
<head>Abbildungslegenden und -nachweise</head>
<desc type="graphic" xml:id="abb1">Propositional contents in eight
Iberian philosophers debating the proper definition of philosophy (The
rendering of SVG files may vary from browser to browser. Zooming and panning
requires the activation of Javascript) (graphic: author).<ref type="graphic"
target="#ontology_2015_001"/></desc>
<desc type="graphic" xml:id="abb2">Propositional contents that are
asserted or denied in the debate on how to define philosophy (graphic:
author).<ref type="graphic" target="#ontology_2015_002"/></desc>
<desc type="graphic" xml:id="abb3">Propositional contents that are
asserted by at least two authors in the debate on how to define philosophy
(graphic: author).<ref type="graphic" target="#ontology_2015_003"/></desc>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</text>
</TEI>